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THE FEDERAL FALSE CLAIMS ACT: A
POTENTIAL DETERRENT TO MEDICAID
FRAUD AND ABUSE
I. Introduction
A scandal that seems certain to occupy headline space during the
foreseeable future is the abuse of the Medicare and Medicaid pro-
grams,' under which state agencies provide medical assistance to
the elderly, needy and disabled with largely-federal funding. Medi-
caid fraud and abuse wastes an estimated three billion dollars of tax
money each year.' Senate investigators who studied the problem
found that "rampant fraud and abuse exists amongpractitioners
participating in the Medicaid program"3 and among participating
medical testing laboratories.'
The Federal False Claims Act (FCA),5 a statute more than a
century old, provides a potential deterrent to such fraud and abuse.
The statute gives the federal government civil remedies' not avail-
able to the defrauded private purchaser of goods and services. For-
mer Attorney General William Saxbe has described this law as "the
most important tool" of the Justice Department's Frauds Section,
which is responsible for seeking recovery of damages through civil
litigation.'
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-96 (Supp. V, 1975).
2. Thomasson, Medicaid Abuse Is About As Old As the Program, N.Y. Times, Sept. 5,
1976, § 4 (The Week in Review), at 4, col. 4.
3. STAFF OF SENATE SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING, 94TH CONG., 2D SEss., FRAUD AND ABUSE
AMONG PRACTITIONERS PARTICIPATING IN THE MEDICAID PROGRAM 209 (Comm. Print 1976)
[hereinafter cited as STAFF REPORT].
4. S. REP. No. 944, 94th Cong., 2d Seas. 47 (1976).
5. 18 U.S.C. §§ 287, 1001 (1970); 31 U.S.C. §§ 231-35 (1970) [hereinafter cited as FCA].
6. The Medicaid law itself provides no remedy as such, only criminal fines, jail terms or
both. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (Supp. V, 1975).
7. 1975 Arr'y GEN. ANN. REP. 68. FCA also contains criminal provisions. 18 U.S.C. § 287
provides:
Whoever makes or presents to any person or officer in the civil, military, or naval
service of the United States, or to any department or agency thereof, any claim
upon or against the United States, or any department or agency thereof, knowing such
claim to be false, fictitious, or fraudulent, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or
imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1970) provides:
Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the
United States knowingly and willfully falsifies, conceals or covers up by any trick,
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This Note will set out a short statement of the history and purpose
of the statute, review the acts that are violative of the law and
discuss its civil provisions including the authorization of qui tam
actions (private plaintiff suing on behalf of the federal government
and sharing in the recovery), the limitations on such actions, and
the recovery of "forfeiture" plus double damages.
II. False Claims Within the Meaning of the False Claims Act
Congress passed the original False Claims Act (Act)8 during the
Civil War to provide protection against those who attempted to
cheat the United States through "frauds and corruptions practiced
in obtaining pay from the Government." ' The Act imposed civil and
criminal liability for presentation of false claims for goods and serv-
ices,'0 and authorized actions by private plaintiffs to recover civil
damages for violations." The successful private plaintiff received
one-half of the proceeds of the suit and any court costs imposed on
the defendant. 2 The Act's civil provisions survive in 31 U.S.C. §
231' 3 with amendments limiting qui tam actions 4 and reducing the
qui tam share of the recovery.'5
scheme, or device a material fact, or makes any false, fictitious or fraudulent state-
ments or representations, or makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the
same to contain any false, fictitious or fraudulent statement or entry, shall be fined
not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
8. Act of March 2, 1863, ch. 67, §§ 1-3, 12 Stat. 696.
9. CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 952 (1863)(remarks of Senator Howard).
10. Act of March 2, 1863, ch. 67, §§ 1-3, 12 Stat. 696.
11. Id. § 4.
12. Id. § 6.
13. 31 U.S.C. § 231 (1970) provides:
Any person not in the military. . . who shall make or cause to be made, or present or
cause to be presented, for payment or approval, to or by any person or officer in the
civil, military, or naval service of the United states, any claim upon or against the
Government of the United States, or any depatment or officer thereof, knowing such
claim to be false, fictitious, or fraudulent, or who, for the purpose of obtaining or aiding
to obtain the payment or approval of such claim, makes, uses, or causes to be made
or used, any false bill, receipt, voucher . ..[or] claim . . . .knowing the same to
contain any fraudulent or fictitious statement or entry, or who enters into any agree-
ment, combination, or conspiracy to defraud the Government of the United States, or
any department or officer thereof, by obtaining or aiding to obtain the payment or
allowance of any false or fraudulent claim . . . .shall forfeit and pay to the United
States the sum of $2,000, and, in addition, double the amount of damages which the
United States may have sustained by reason of the doing or committing [of] such act,
together with the costs of suit . . ..
14. Id. § 232(C); see text accompanying notes 73-82 infra.
15. 31 U.S.C. § 232(E) (1970); see text accompanying notes 83-87 infra.
NOTES
A. The Nature of the Claim
Congress intended the FCA to stop "plundering of the public
treasury."' 6 False claims include not only billing the Government
for nonexistent, worthless or overpriced goods and services but any
wrongful actions which have the purpose and effect of causing the
Government immediately to pay out money or transfer property. 7
Therefore FCA liability attaches when the defendant claims pay-
ment for goods or services not actually provided;"8 and when the
defendant mislabels inferior goods and substitutes them for items
that should be supplied under a government contract." This is true
even when the defendant contends that the mislabeled items are
interchangeable with the ones called for, at least where the items
supplied fail to meet specifications. 0
The FCA prohibits presentment of fraudulently obtained govern-
ment checks for payment, even if the proceeds ultimately go to the
intended recipients.2' If the defendant knows that the Government
issued checks to him by mistake, the FCA holds him liable for false
claims when he cashes the checks.22
B. Claims "against the United States"
The FCA speaks in terms of false claims "upon or against the
Government of the United States" presented for payment or ap-
proval to or by any one in the federal government or the military. 3
Clearly included are claims against the public treasury,24 other fed-
eral departments and agencies," and wholly-owned government cor-
16. United States v. McNinch, 356 U.S. 595, 599 (1958).
17. United States v. Tieger, 234 F.2d 589, 591 (3d Cir. 1956), approved in United States
v. McNinch, 356 U.S. 595, 599 (1958).
18. See, e.g., United States v. Greenberg, 237 F. Supp. 439 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); United
States v. Gardner, 73 F. Supp. 644 (N.D. Ala. 1947).
19. See, e.g., United States v. Bornstein, 423 U.S. 303 (1976); Henry v. United States,
424 F.2d 677 (5th Cir. 1970).
20. United States v. Aerodex, Inc., 469 F.2d 1003, 1007 (5th Cir. 1972).
21. United States v. Silver, 384 F. Supp. 617 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd, 515 F.2d 505 (2d Cir.
1975).
22. See, e.g., Peterson v. Weinberger, 508 F.2d 45 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub noma. Peter-
son v. Matthews, 423 U.S. 830 (1975); United States v. Scolnick, 219 F. Supp. 408 (D. Mass.
1963).
23. 31 U.S.C. § 231 (1970).
24. See, e.g., Evans v. United States, 11 F.2d 37 (4th Cir. 1926)(claim for tax refund).
25. United States v. McNinch, 356 U.S. 595 (1958) (Federal Housing Administration).
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porations.5 Also included are claims against state and private agen-
cies that disburse federal funds."
In United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess18 the Supreme Court
affirmed a trial court judgment against respondent electrical con-
tractors who had engaged in collusive bidding to obtain contracts
from Pennsylvania municipalities and school districts. Respondents
had known that the Federal Public Works Administration (PWA)
funded the projects, and that applicable federal regulations re-
quired competitive bidding." They submitted estimates for pay-
ment to the local governments involved, and were compensated
from a joint bank account containing both federal and local funds.
The federal government would never have placed the money in the
bank account had it known that respondents received the contract
through collusive bidding. 0 The Court concluded that Congress in-
tended FCA to impose liability on any person who knowingly helped
cause the Government to pay claims grounded in fraud, whether or
not that person had direct contractual relations with the Govern-
ment.'
III. Scienter and Intent
FCA liability attaches only when the defendant knows: (1) that
the claim he presents, or causes to be presented, is false; or (2) that
a document he causes to be used in support of a claim contains a
"fraudulent or fictitious statement or entry."3 Mere negligence in
the preparation or submission of claims does not satisfy this scienter
requirement. 3 Knowledge of the falsity must be personal to the
defendant, 3' and will not be imputed to a supervisor or superior.35
Thus, the law does not impute the knowledge to a corporate em-
26. Rainwater v. United States, 356 U.S. 590 (1958) (Commodity Credit Corp.).
27. See United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1943).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 542-43.
30. Id. at 543.
31. Id. at 544-45.
32. 31 U.S.C. § 231 (1970).
33. United States v. Ekelman & Assocs., Inc., 532 F.2d 545 (6th Cir. 1976); United States
v. Shapleigh, 54 F. 126 (8th Cir. 1893); contra, United States v. Coop. Grain & Supply Co.,
476 F.2d 47 (8th Cir. 1973).
34. United States v. Priola, 272 F.2d 589 (5th Cir. 1959).
35. United States v. Aerodex, Inc., 469 F.2d 1003, 1008-09 (5th Cir. 1972).
496 [Vol. V
19771 NOTES
ployer where the wrongdoer's goal is personal profit rather than
enrichment of the corporation."
Courts have expressed opposing views as to whether the FCA
requires specific intent to defraud, deceive, or obtain property
wrongfully. However, the decisions almost invariably have found
liability when the defendant knew he was submitting a false claim,
and no liability when he did not.3
IV. The Number of Forefeitures
FCA imposes a "forfeiture" of $2,000 for doing or committing
"any of the acts prohibited. ' 3 The forfeiture is considered a civil
penalty because the FCA's chief purpose is to restore to the federal
government money taken through false claims, and because the
defendant is not subject to imprisonment for failure to satisfy the
judgment. 3 Therefore, actions under the criminal and civil forfei-
ture provisions of FCA do not subject the defendant to double jeop-
ardy.40
The defendant is liable for a forfeiture for each false claim where
"the incidence of fraud is . . .clearly individualized."'" The num-
ber of contracts is not controlling, since the contractor might pres-
ent many false claims under a single contract and thus "convert 'the
36. United States v. Ridglea State Bank, 357 F.2d 495 (5th Cir. 1966); contra, United
States v. Hangar One, Inc., 406 F. Supp. 60, 139 (N.D. Ala. 1975).
37. See, e.g., United States v. Aerodex, Inc., 469 F.2d 1003, 1007 (5th Cir. 1972) ("guilty
knowledge of a purpose on the part of [the defendant] to cheat the Government" required);
United States v. Mead, 426 F.2d 118, 121, 123 (9th Cir. 1970) (Government must prove each
element of common law fraud); Acme Process Equip. Co. v. United States, 347 F.2d 509, 527
(Ct. Cl. 1965), rev'd on other grounds, 385 U.S. 138 (1966)(knowing presentation of a false
claim sufficient)(dictum); Fleming v. United States, 336 F.2d 475, 478-79 (10th Cir. 1964),
cert. denied, 380 U.S. 907 (1965) (no need to prove every element of common law fraud);
United States v. National Wholesalers, 236 F.2d 944, 950 (9th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353
U.S. 930 (1957)(intent to work a deceit required); United States ex rel. Brensilber v. Bausch
& Lomb Optical Co., 131 F.2d 545, 546 (2d Cir. 1942), affd mem., 320 U.S. 711 (1943) (fraud
"in its accepted sense of deceit"); United States v. Foster Wheeler Corp., 316 F. Supp. 963,
967 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 447 F.2d 100 (2d Cir. 1971) (no need to prove intent to deceive);
United States v. Park Motors, Inc., 107 F. Supp. 168, 177 (E.D. Tenn. 1952)(dismissing action
for failure to prove that defendant "intended ... to get something out of the Government
to which he knew he was not entitled.")
38. 31 U.S.C. § 231 (1970).
39. United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 551 (1943).
40. Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148 (1956).
41. United States v. Bornstein, 423 U.S. 303, 310-11 (1976).
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Act's forfeiture provision into little more than a $2,000 license for
• . .fraud.' "4
The number of false claims, or invoices, vouchers or bills, does not
necessarily determine the number of forfeitures in all kinds of cases.
In United States v. Bornstein," defendant subcontractor supplied
hundreds of misbranded electron tubes to a prime contractor mak-
ing radio sets for the Army. Defendant sent these tubes to the prime
contractor in three shipments, with three false certificates of com-
pliance and twenty-one packing lists bearing falsified inspection
symbols.4 The prime contractor submitted thirty-five claims for
payment, which the Government paid with eight vouchers." The
Supreme Court ordered imposition of a forfeiture for each of the
three shipments, since each time the defendant shipped tubes it
thereby enabled and caused the prime contractor to build substand-
ard radios for which the Government would be asked to pay." The
number of claims did not determine the number of forfeitures be-
cause the defendant did not necessarily cause the prime contractor
to submit any particular number of claims, and FCA penalizes a
person for his own acts, not for the acts of others. 7
The Supreme Court has not decided expressly whether a forfei-
ture must be imposed for each violation. The Fifth Circuit has held
that the number of forfeitures may be reduced if the recovery would
do more than "reflect a fair ratio to damages."" An earlier Fifth
Circuit opinion and two Fourth Circuit decisions concluded that
courts have no choice but to impose forfeitures for each violation."
The sum of money subject to forfeiture may exceed greatly the
dollar amount of the false claims. 0 Liability arises, and a forfeiture
42. Id.
43. Id. at 303.
44. United States v. Bornstein, 361 F. Supp. 869, 872-73 (D.N.J. 1973).
45. United States v. Bornstein, 504 F.2d 368, 372 (3d Cir. 1974).
46. 423 U.S. at 312-13.
47. Id.
48. Peterson v. Weinberger, 508 F.2d 45 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nor. Peterson v.
Matthews, 423 U.S. 830 (1975).
49. United States v. Ridglea State Bank, 357 F.2d 495 (5th Cir. 1966); United States v.
Brown, 274 F.2d 107 (4th Cir. 1960); United States v. Cato Bros., Inc., 273 F.2d 153 (4th Cir.
1959).
50. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 274 F.2d 107 (4th Cir. 1960); United States v. De
Witt, 265 F.2d 393 (5th Cir. 1959)(summary judgment against defendants for forfeitures and
double damages with respect to twenty-nine transactions, and trial ordered as to twenty-one
others-each involving a false claim for $160).
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may be assessed, where the Government suffers no actual damages
-as, for example, where the falsity of the claim is discovered before
payment.5
V. Recovery For Damages
In addition to forfeitures, FCA imposes liability for "double the
damages which the United States may have sustained."52 An action
under the statute is civil rather than criminal in nature even
though more than actual damages may be recovered.53 Thus, the
possibility of double damages does not subject the defendant to
double jeopardy when civil and criminal suits are based on the same
conduct.54
The measure of damages is the "benefit of the bargain"-the
difference in value between the items claimed for and those sup-
plied.55 "Consequential" damages such as the cost of removing what
was supplied and installing what was specified may not be re-
covered.56 In collusive bidding cases the measure of damages is the
difference between the contract price and what it would have been
if the bidding had been free and open. 7
Recoverable damages must be doubled before deductions for com-
pensatory payments. Otherwise, the liability of the defendant
would be affected by payments from collateral sources such as his
prime contractor, and defendant could nullify the double damages
clause by tendering payment before judgment is rendered. 9
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has held that pre-
judgment interest should be assessed and doubled because "interest
can properly be recovered as 'damage' under the False Claims
Act." ° The Second and Fifth Circuits disagree, because Congress
51. Rex Trailer Co. v, United States, 350 U.S. 148, 153 n.5 (1956).
52. 31 U.S.C. § 231 (1970).
53. United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 550-52 (1943).
54. Id.
55. United States v. Bornstein, 423 U.S. 303, 316 n.13 (1976); contra, United States v.
Aerodex, Inc., 469 F.2d 1003, 1010-11 (5th Cir. 1972).
56. United States v. Aerodex, Inc. 469 F.2d 1003, 1010-11 (5th Cir. 1972); see United
States v. Bornstein, 423 U.S. 303, 316 (1976).
57. United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 41 F. Supp. 197, 214 (W.D. Pa. 1941), aff d, 317
U.S. 537 (1943).
58. United States v. Bornstein, 423 U.S. 303, 316 (1976).
59. Id.
60. United States v. Cooperative Grain & Supply Co., 476 F.2d 47, 62 (8th Cir. 1973).
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chose double recovery plus forfeiture as the means of ensuring that
the Government is made whole."
VI. Qui Tam Suits
Any one may bring suit on behalf of himself and the federal gov-
ernment for FCA violations, and share in the recovery if successful. 2
The Supreme Court in United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess 3 ap-
proved this qui tam action"' as an effective means of preventing
frauds upon the public treasury, 5 although at the time the Act
allowed unscrupulous plaintiffs to reap windfalls by bringing suits
based on information obtained merely by reading indictments, tran-
scripts of congressional hearings, and other government papers.
Congress amended the statute less than a year later. 7
Under the amended Act a private plaintiff must notify the Attor-
ney General and turn over the evidence and information underlying
the action. If the Government intervenes within sixty days, the qui
tam plaintiff may not maintain the action unless the Government
fails to carry it forward with due diligence." Intervention does not
deprive the private plaintiff of a vested right, since the test of his
right to recover is the successful prosecution of the suit, not the
filing of the complaint. 0 No qui tam suit may be commenced after
61. See, e.g., Peterson v. Weinberger, 508 F.2d 45, 55 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.
Peterson v. Matthews, 423 U.S. 830 (1975); United States v. Foster Wheeler Corp., 447 F.2d
100, 102 (2d Cir. 1971).
62. 31 U.S.C. § 232 (1970).
63. 317 U.S. 537 (1943).
64. A qui tam action is defined as:
An action brought by an informer, under a statute which establishes a penalty for the
commission or ommission of a certain act, and provides that the same shall be recover-
able in a civil action, part of the penalty to go to any person who will bring such action
and the remainder to the state or some other institution ....
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1414 (Rev. 4th ed. 1968).
65. 317 U.S. at 540-41.
66. Id. at 558-62 (Jackson, J., dissenting); see also 89 CONG. REc. 10,848-49 (1943)(remarks
of Congressman Hancock).
67. Act of December 23, 1943, ch. 377, 57 Stat. 608 (codified at 31 U.S.C. §§ 232-35
(1970)).
68. 31 U.S.C. § 232(C) (1970).
69. Id.
70. Sherr v. Anaconda Wire & Cable Co., 149 F.2d 680 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S.
762 (1945); United States ex rel. Rodriquez v. Weekly Publications, Inc., 68 F. Supp. 767
(S.D.N.Y. 1946).
NOTES
the Government 7' or another private plaintiff" has brought suit with
respect to the same transactions.
The amendments provide that the court shall have no jurisdic-
tionto hear the qui tam plaintiff's action "whenever it shall be made
to appear that such suit was based upon evidence or information in
the possession of the United States, or any agency, officer or em-
ployee thereof, at the time such suit was brought . . . ." This
"original information" limitation goes to the subject matter juris-
diction of the court to hear the private plaintiff's suit, but it does
not affect the court's power to hear the case as presented by the
United States.74
The limitation applies even where the plaintiff has given the Gov-
ernment the information before bringing the action." It does not
operate where the official possessing the facts is implicated in the
alleged fraud." Even if the plaintiff has researched and correlated
information pointing to a violation, the qui tam suit is barred if the
"essential facts," including 'negative facts" (such as a failure to file
required papers), were in the hands of the Government. It is not
necessary that any single official knew of their existence or cumula-
tive significance."
The original Act gave the qui tam plaintiff one-half of the recov-
ery and any court costs imposed on the defendant. 8 Under the
amended Act, the court may award plaintiff the amount it deems
fair compensation for obtaining a satisfied judgment or settlement,
but no more than one-fourth of the recovery plus reasonable com-
71. United States ex rel. Benjamin v. Hendrick, 52 F. Supp. 60 (S.D.N.Y. 1943).
72. United States ex rel. B.F. Goodrich Co., 41 F. Supp. 574 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
73. 31 U.S.C. § 232(C) (1970).
74. United States ex rel. Bayarsky v. Brooks, 154 F.2d 344 (3d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.
Brooks v. United States ex rel. Bayarsky, 329 U.S. 716 (1946); United States v. Pittman, 151
F.2d 851 (5th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 843 (1946).
75. United States v. Aster, 176 F. Supp. 208 (E.D. Pa. 1959), aff'd, 275 F.2d 281 (3d Cir.
1960). An exception was made for suits pending at the effective date of the amendment. 31
U.S.C. § 232(C) (1970).
76. United States v. Rippetoe, 178 F.2d 735 (4th Cir. 1949).
77. United States v. Armour & Co., 146 F. Supp. 546 (D.D.C. 1956), aff'd, 254 F.2d 90
(D.C. Cir. 1958).
78. Act of March 2, 1863, ch. 67, § 6, 12 Stat. 696.
79. The Act always has prohibited withdrawal or discontinuance of qui tam suits without
the written consent of the court and the district attorney. 31 U.S.C. § 232(B) (1970); Act of
March 2, 1863, ch. 67, §4, 12 Stat. 698.
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pensation for necessary expenses and any court costs imposed on the
defendant.'" If the United States intervenes in the suit, the court
may award the person, who originally brought suit, up to one-tenth
of the satisfied judgment or settlement" as compensation for having
disclosed original information."s
VII. Medicaid Fraud and the False Claim Act
In 1965 Congress increased the federal government's participation
in public health care through grants to the states.13 Almost immedi-
ately, fraud and abuse of the Medicaid and Medicare programs
began. 4 Combined local and federal expenditures under Medicaid
have grown from $1.5 billion in fiscal 1966 to the current fifteen
billion dollars a year. 5 An estimated three billion dollars or more
in tax money-i.e., at least 20 percent of the total-is wasted an-
nually through fraud and abuse.
The Medicaid law imposes criminal liability for some kinds of
fraud and abuse." It provides penalties ranging up to a $10,000 fine
and one year imprisonment for knowing and willful misrepresen-
tation of a material fact in an application for Medicaid benefits or
payments.8 The same misdemeanor penalties attach for seeking,
offering or taking bribes, kickbacks, rebates or referral fees in
connection with Medicaid services or payments. 9
The extent of the fraud and abuse in the Medicaid program indi-
cates that the possibility of prosecution and conviction has failed to
provide an adequate deterrent. Recent legislation authorizes the
80. 31 U.S.C. § 232(E)(2) (1970).
81. This is a departure from the historic rule, at least in England, that the sovereign could
not compromise or settle a qui tam suit. See Sherr v. Anaconda Wire & Cable Co., 149 F.2d
680 (2d Cir. 1945).
82. 31 U.S.C. § 232(E)(1) (1970).
83. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-96 (1970).
84. Thomasson, supra note 2, at 4, col. 3.
85. STAFF REPORT, supra note 3, at 5.
86. Thomasson, supra note 2.
87. Senate sponsored amendments that would have increased the penalties failed to win
House approval in the waning days of the 94th Congress. 122 CONG. REC. H12,181-82 (daily
ed. Oct. 1, 1976).
88. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(a) (Supp. V, 1975).
89. Id. § 1395nn(b).
90. See, e.g., Thomasson, supra note 2; STAFF REPORT, supra note 3.
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appointment of an inspector general within the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare to audit the Medicaid programs to
detect fraud and abuse." Whatever may be the effect of that mea-
sure, and others directed specifically to Medicaid problems, FCA
should continue to play a potentially important-perhaps a supe-
rior-role in preventing and punishing Medicaid fraud.
The criminal penalties for false claims under FCA range up to
five years imprisonment, compared with one year under the Medi-
caid law." Possible fines under both statutes are $10,000. In addi-
tion, the FCA civil provisions expose the defendant to liability93 for
$2,000 forfeitures, double damages and court costs. 4 The wrongdoer
also risks the possibility of a qui tam suit by a private plaintiff-an
associate, an employee, or even a patient95-who seeks to share in
the recovery.
In United States ex rel. Davis v. Long's Drugs, Inc.,9" a pharma-
cist brought an FCA action against drug stores he had worked for,
alleging he saw them submit false claims for prescriptions to Medi-
Cal, the state agency created to implement Medicaid in California.
Defendants moved to dismiss. They contended the claims were not
claims against the United States, and argued that plaintiff could
not maintain the qui tam suit because state prosecutors and Medi-
Cal officials had the information underlying the suit before the ac-
tion was brought. 7
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
California held that MediCal claims were claims against the United
States, because the state agency was 50 percent federally funded
and subject to extensive federal regulation. The court followed the
principle of United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess,99 in which the
Supreme Court held that claims against Pennsylvania munici-
91. Act of October 15, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-505, 90 Stat. 2429.
92. 18 U.S.C. §§ 287, 1001 (1970); 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (1970).
93. Actions for criminal penalties and FCA civil forfeiture and double damages may be
based on the same transactions. See text accompanying notes 44-45, 58-59 supra.
94. 31 U.S.C. § 231 (1970).
95. See Peterson v. Weinberger, 508 F.2d 45, 54 (5th Cir), cert. denied sub nom. Peterson
v. Matthews, 423 U.S. 830 (1975).
96. 411 F. Supp. 1144 (S.D. Cal. 1976).
97. Id. at 1144-45.
98. Id. at 1146-49.
99. 317 U.S. 537 (1943).
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palities and school districts for work on federally-funded projects
were claims against the United States. The Hess decision leaves
little room for doubt that claims against MediCal and the other
state and private Medicaid intermediaries are claims against the
United States within the meaning of FCA.
The Long's Drugs decision also held that data in the possession
of MediCal officials and state prosecutors were not information in
the possession of the United States within the meaning of the
"original information" limitation on qui tam suits under the FCA.'"°
No reason emerges why the statute should be interpreted to the
contrary. As long as the federal government does not require routine
disclosure by the states of all claims information, qui tam suits for
Medicaid fraud will be possible both where the wrongdoer has suc-
ceeded in concealing his fraud, and where state officials know of the
fraud or would know if facts in their possession were correlated so
as to detect violations.
A relatively few medical practitioners and laboratories account
for a disproportionately large share of the total sum siphoned away
by Medicaid fraud and abuse."" Each must employ individuals who
can observe any wrongdoing, as allegedly was observed by the plain-
tiff in Long's Drugs. Many of these individuals might find it advan-
tageous to bring suit under the FCA, if they knew of the qui tam
provisions. The private plaintiff brings suit at his own cost, 02 but
his share of the recovery may be substantial. 3 If the Government
intervenes after filing of the complaint, the person who brought suit
may avoid the potentially high cost of pre-trial discovery and still
share in the recovery." 4 A plaintiff who lacks sufficient resources to
maintain the action could retain counsel on a contingent fee basis,
and the attorney could guarantee or advance the expenses of the
litigation if the client remained ultimately liable for them.0 5 These
considerations, however, must be carefully weighed against the
probabilities of plaintiff's loss of employment; lack of government
100. 411 F. Supp. at 1149-53.
101. S. REP. No. 944, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.. (1976); STAFF REPORT, supra note 3.
102. 31 U.S.C. § 232(B) (1970)..
103. See id. § 232(E); see also text accompanying note 130 infra.
104. 31 U.S.C. § 232(E)(1) (1970).
105. See, e.g., N.Y. STATE BAR ASS'N, THE LAWYER'S CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
42, DR 5-103 (1975).
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intervention; and the unwillingness of members of the Bar to take
cases on a contingent fee basis.
Much of the fraud and abuse that otherwise might go undetected
can be brought to light by private plaintiffs motivated by the pos-
sibility of financial gain. Knowledge of that possibility can deter
potential wrongdoers from practicing fraud against Medicaid.
Moreover, not every action for Medicaid fraud will necessitate the
expenditure of time and resources of government prosecutors. The
United States may refrain from intervening and continue to recover
double damages and forfeitures, less the qui tam plaintiff's share. 00
Additional savings in government time and expense result from
application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel to FCA cases. Once
a defendant has been convicted under the FCA's criminal provi-
sions, there is no need for the Government to litigate the issue of
his civil liability for the same transactions.'07 If the Government
waives damages, it avoids the necessity of proving their extent, °0
but retains the right to recover forfeitures of $2,000 for each viola-
tion. 0
Senate investigators have catalogued the most common forms of
Medicaid fraud and abuse in so-called Medicaid mills. These in-
clude referring patients from one practitioner to another within the
facility, even though there is no medical need ("ping-ponging");
treating each family member who accompanies a patient to the
facility, or billing as though each received treatment ("ganging,"
which usually involves a mother and her children); multiple billing;
billing for services not rendered, for services more extensive than
those actually rendered ("upgrading"), or for services rendered by
others or by unlicensed practitioners; supplying less than the quant-
ity of medication prescribed ("shorting"); and substituting less-
expensive "generic" drugs for name-brand drugs."1°
The FCA clearly encompasses the practices of double billing, bill-
ing for services not rendered, "shorting" and "upgrading.""' The
substitution of "generic" drugs for name-brand medication may
106. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 231-32 (1970).
107. United States v. Zul, 418 F. Supp. 252 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
108. See id. at 254.
109. See text accompanying note 56 supra.
110. STAFF REPORT, supra note 3, at 18-19.
111. See text accompanying notes 17-18 supra.
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constitute a false claim."' Charging the name-brand price for the
less-expensive "generic" is clearly a violation." 3 "Ganging" and
"ping-ponging" result in claims not properly reimbursable under
Medicaid, since the services performed are not "reasonable and
necessary" to the diagnosis or treatment of an illness, injury or
malformity."14 Therefore, claims made as a result of these practices
are "false claims" even if the unnecessary services have been ren-
dered in fact."'
Another kind of false claim formed the basis of liability in
Peterson v. Weinberger."' Plaintiff physician sued the Government
for stopping his Medicare payments, and the Government counter-
claimed under the FCA. The doctor's brother owned the majority
interest in a nursing home and the sole interest in a corporation that
provided the nursing home with physical therapy services. The
nursing home lost its Medicare eligibility and the corporation
lacked certification, so the owner found himself unable to claim
reimbursement for certain treatments that actually had been ren-
dered. He had an employee prepare claim forms, using the doctor's
"provider number" as though the doctor were making the claims.
He forged the physician's signature as certifying that the doctor had
rendered or supervised the treatments personally, as Medicare re-
quired."7
The nursing home owner was both civilly and criminally liable
under the FCA for submitting the claims."' Moreover, the doctor
was civilly liable for depositing the reimbursement checks to his
own account"9 and forwarding the proceeds to his brother.'210
The trial court imposed double damages for 120 false claims, but
112. See text accompanying note 20 supra.
113. See, e.g., United States v. Greenberg, 237 F. Supp. 439 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (liability
where government contractor certified he paid more in wages than he actually had in execut-
ing cost-plus-fixed-fee contract).
114. 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a)(1) (1970).
115. See, e.g., United States v. De Witt, 265 F.2d 393 (5th Cir. 1959) (applications result-
ing in payments in connection with loan guarantees not properly obtained).
116. 508 F.2d 45 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nor. Peterson v. Matthews, 423 U.S. 830
(1975).
117. Id. at 47-48.
118. Id. at 54; United States v. Peterson, 488 F.2d 645 (5th Cir. 1974).
119. The checks were from a private insurance carrier which operated a Medicaid program
pursuant to government contract. 508 F.2d\at 48. False claims need not be made directly
against the United States. See text accompanying notes 27-31 supra.
120. 508 F.2d at 48-49.
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forfeitures for only fifty. 2' The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
agreed that the number of forfeitures might be reduced to reflect a
fair ratio to damages.'22 Although, an earlier Fifth Circuit opinion
apparently had approved the opposite view:'23
[Tihe $2,000 forfeiture is not something ancillary or discretionary . . . . It
is not surprising, in light of the language of the statute, that the forfeiture
amount has been held to be mandatory and beyond the power of the courts
to modify no matter how disproportionate the forfeiture may seem in relation
to the actual damage suffered by the government.
No matter which view prevails, civil liability for false claims
against Medicaid can be much greater than the amount falsely
claimed. Even in the Peterson case, 120 false claims amounting to
$16,153.44 resulted in assessment of fifty forfeitures of $2,000
each. "'24 Depending upon the billing procedure of the state agency,
insurance carrier or other claims intermediary, the practitioner's
submission of each false claim may constitute a causative act giving
rise to liability. Where the claims are forwarded as itemized by the
"provider," his submission of each claim to the Medicaid agent
causes the agent to present each one to the United States. Since the
number of claims is not fortuitous or beyond the defendant's knowl-
edge or control, a forfeiture might be assessed for each one. 2" There-
fore, liability for a $2,000 forfeiture might result from each false
claim, e.g., a twenty-five dollar examination, or an overcharge or
"shorting" of a few cents.
VIII. Conclusion
The FCA provides a potentially effective remedy and deterrent to
Medicaid fraud and abuse. The authorization of qui tam suits may
reduce the chance that fraud will go undetected by giving private
citizens financial incentive to expose it. Many who might profit by
bringing suit are employees and patients of dishonest practitioners
121. Peterson v. Richardson, 370 F. Supp. 1259, 1267-68 (N.D. Tex. 1973), aff'd sub nom.
Peterson v. Weinberger, 508 F.2d 45 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub noma. Peterson v. Matthews,
423 U.S. 830 (1975).
122. 508 F.2d at 55.
123. United States v. Ridglea State Bank, 357 F.2d 495, 499 (5th Cir. 1966)(dictum)(cita-
tions omitted).
124. 370 F. Supp. at 1267-68, afJ'd, 508 F.2d at 55.
125. See United States v. Bornstein, 423 U.S. 303 (1976); see text accompanying notes
48-52 supra.
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and testing labs. Litigation can be costly, but the private plaintiff
may avoid substantially all of the expense if the Government
chooses to intervene in the action. If the qui tam plaintiff lacks the
resources to maintain the suit, he may be able to resort to a con-
tingent fee arrangement with an attorney willing to advance or guar-
antee the expenses.
The FCA's criminal sanctions are more severe than those in the
Medicaid law, and the FCA provisions for double damages and
forfeitures expose the defendant to greater liability than an action
for actual damages. The Government is more likely to be made
whole, and the defendant less likely to profit from his wrongdoing.
Perhaps most important, a relatively small false claim may result
in a relatively large liability.
If the applicability of the FCA and its qui tam provisions to Medi-
caid fraud becomes more widely known, it might have significant
remedial and deterrent effects. Medicaid and Medicare "providers"
will be aware that financial motives may prompt employees, asso-
ciates and patients to supplement the Government's efforts to de-
tect fraud and abuse and sue for recovery. They may realize that
the potential losses from false claims are greater than the potential
gains.
Peter J. Sherman
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